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Neighborhood Dynamics and the Housing Price Effects of 
Spatially Targeted Economic Development Policy
*
 
Neighborhoods are the result of a complicated interplay between residential choice, housing 
supply and the influences of the larger metropolitan system on its constituent parts. We 
model this interplay as a system of reduced-form equations in order to examine the effects of 
a generous spatially targeted economic development program (the federal Empowerment 
Zone program) on neighborhood characteristics, especially housing values. This system of 
equations approach allows us to compute direct effects of the policy intervention as well as 
the effects mediated through non-price channels such as changes in the housing stock or 
neighborhood demographics. In the process, we are able to shed light on the rich 
simultaneity among neighborhood characteristics, including housing prices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Neighborhoods – on the one hand – are places.  People live, work and commute through 
these places.  They are centers of residents’ activities and social networks.  From a more 
disinterested perspective, neighborhoods are a set of characteristics defined in space.  
Neighborhoods are characterized – at least to the econometrician – by factors such as 
population density, demographics, housing vintage and value.   We are not the first to 
point out that these dimensions defining a neighborhood do not develop in isolation from 
one another.  Neighborhoods are a result of the complicated interplay of these factors and 
the broader forces working on their metropolitan area and even the metropolitan system 
in general.   This analysis addresses this rich simultaneity in the process of evaluating the 
effects of the federal Empowerment Zone (EZ) program: a generous spatially targeted 
economic development policy.   
Because the EZ program is intended to improve neighborhoods along a variety of 
dimensions (McCarthy, 1998), an analysis of the program’s effects on housing value is 
appropriate.  Aside from the obvious connection between improved housing prices and 
the local property tax base, changes in housing prices reflect changes in local quality of 
life. Yet, home prices are a result of the complicated interplay among economic, 
demographic and housing market forces described above.  The EZ program’s effects will 
thus be seen in making neighborhoods more attractive along a variety of dimensions 
which then affect house values indirectly.  
This paper looks at the effects of EZ program participation in a simultaneous-
equations setting which allows for the program’s multi-dimensional effects and 
interactions among the various neighborhood indicators.  The specification also allows us   2
to assess the value of the program’s effects on neighborhood indicators other than home 
values, compute both direct and indirect effects of the program on home values and 
assess the importance of simultaneity in the setting of neighborhood housing prices and 
demographic and housing stock characteristics.  
Identifying the causal effects of the program with both a difference-in-differences 
approach and through the use of exogenous instruments, we find that the program had 
substantial positive effects on neighborhood home values, but small and mostly off-
setting indirect effects.  The process highlights a large degree of simultaneity in the 
system, with some especially important simultaneity effects in the price equation.  
Allowing for the simultaneity substantially changes the coefficients of many predictors of 
home prices, reversing the implied causality in many cases.  Simultaneity in the 
endogenous variables also affects the coefficients of variables not included in the system, 
so that the simultaneity is not “benign” even with respect to exogenous variables’ effects. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows.  The next section provides some 
background on the Empowerment Zone program and previous literature.  Section III 
discusses our data, empirical model and identifying assumptions.  Section IV presents the 
results, which are discussed in section V.  A final section concludes with some policy 
implications and suggestions for future research.     
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Neighborhood dynamics and simultaneity 
As Rosenthal (2008) points out, neighborhood change is a pervasive aspect of American 
urban environments.  The changing fortunes of neighborhoods have been understood   3
through comparative static analyses (such as changing transportation costs in the classic 
Alonso/Muth models) as well as in more dynamic models such as the Schelling model of 
neighborhood tipping (Schelling, 1969, 1971), or models of neighborhood 
succession/filtering (Brueckner, 1980; Bond and Coulson, 1989; Bruekner and Rosenthal, 
forthcoming) and various other dynamic models (Miyao, 1987). 
  The empirical examination of neighborhood change by economists is not as well 
developed, partly because the data requirements are considerable.  Aaronson (2001) looks 
at the question using vector auto-regression, finding the interactions between his 
neighborhood variables are substantial, but that shocks to neighborhood characteristics 
tend to dissipate over time.  A similar stability is found in Galster et al. (2007) across five 
cities and several neighborhood characteristics.  Rosenthal (2008) shows that 
neighborhoods change over very long cycles and that change is driven by several 
neighborhood characteristics.  Card et al. (2007) estimate neighborhood tipping points in 
the tradition of Schelling, and find that city-specific tipping points correlate sensibly with 
metropolitan political and opinion measures.   
  Noonan et al. (2007) and Krupka and Noonan (2009) look at the neighborhood as 
a system of equations in estimating various policy interventions.  In those papers – as 
well as here – the estimates show that the measurement of policy effects can be sensitive 
to how the empirical specification treats the simultaneity amongst the variables.  In those 
earlier papers, however, the simultaneous system takes a back seat to the estimation of 
the policy effects.  Here, with a more parsimonious system, we are able to explore the 
simultaneity more closely, as well as compute the policy effects.       4
  Previous work on neighborhood change has taken multiple empirical strategies.    
Earlier related work uses single-equation models to describe neighborhood change, but 
these approaches are limited in their ability to capture the complex interplay among 
various neighborhood indicators.  Unlike Aaronson’s (2001) earlier multi-equation VAR 
model, we use smaller units of analysis and more indicators, and our simultaneous-
equations approach imposes a different structure on the relationship between the 
variables, allowing for contemporaneous as well as lagged influence of system variables, 
and relying on predetermined variables as instruments to identify the parameters of 
endogenous variables.  Similar to Aaronson (2001), Noonan et al. (2007) and Rosenthal 
(2008), our approach captures neighborhood dynamics by explicitly modeling how past 
neighborhood characteristics affect future equilibria.  The primary departure in this 
analysis is the emphasis on how these characteristics are simultaneously determined (or 
how they co-evolve). 
  
Spatially targeted policy and the Empowerment zone program 
Spatially targeted policies have been popular with both the federal and state governments 
despite Winnick’s (1966) well articulated argument against them.  These policies can be 
seen as addressing the spatial mismatch between inner-city, low-skill labor supply and 
suburban and exurban low-skill labor demand, as characterized by Kain (1968).  Another 
possible justification for these programs is budgetary.  Evidence presented in Bartik 
(1991) suggests that localized tax incentives could actually be revenue enhancing, at least 
from the considerably limited perspective of the targeted area.   5
Many of the costs of spatially targeted economic development programs come 
from tax incentives.  Typically, targeted areas are selected based on some set of need-
based criteria.  During the 1980’s many states created such programs.  Generically these 
programs are referred to as “enterprise zones”
1 where employers were given economic 
incentives to create jobs specifically in these depressed areas.  These economic incentives 
can include lighter regulatory burdens and tax abatements.  Peters and Fisher (2002) 
provide some historical background on the inception and adaptation of these programs.   
The federal role begins with Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities 
Act of 1993 (as Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993).  This 
policy was a major component of the Clinton Administration’s urban policy following the 
Los Angeles riots in 1992.  The Empowerment Zone program coupled tax incentives and 
wage credits with large amounts of federal funding for community development. More 
than just job stimulus through tax incentives, the EZ program required community 
partnerships to address broader economic and social conditions, which marked a 
departure from previous federal urban renewal projects (Oakley and Tsao, 2007b).   
For the urban EZ program, HUD reviewed proposals from cities and awarded EZ 
designations.  Between the competition’s announcement in January 1994 and a June 1994 
deadline, 78 cities applied for the EZ program.
2  The extensive application process 
solicited proposals that combined innovative programs, detailed maps and census data 
                                                 
1 Terminology in this area can be confusing as state and federal programs have various yet similar names 
and fall under the broader category of enterprise zones, which are often also given the abbreviation of 
“EZ”.  Throughout this discussion, we refer to federal Empowerment Zones as EZs and use the term 
“enterprise zone” in reference to the many, less-generous state and local place-based initiatives. 
2 Eligibility was based on population of the proposed EZ, economic conditions and geographic size, certain 
minimum poverty rates in EZ census tracts, not being more than three contiguous parcels, location within a 
single state and jurisdiction of nominating local government and not including the CBD in the zone 
generally (Oakley and Tsao, 2006).   6
and participation and funding from private and public actors. This application process is 
described and analyzed in Wallace (2003, 2004), Greenbaum and Bondonio (2004), 
Hanson (2008) and Busso and Kline (2008).   
EZs sought to enhance both human and physical capital as well as promote 
broader community revitalization.  Designated urban EZs each received $100 million in 
federal (Title XX SSBG) funds plus tax incentives
3 (employment tax credits
4, accelerated 
depreciation and tax-exempt facility bonds) for businesses located inside the zone.  The 
SSBG funds could be spent promoting employment, social services, housing and 
homeownership and transportation (Oakley and Tsao, 2006).  The host municipalities 
could also issue tax-exempt bonds to fund additional improvements to the areas.  The 
federal benefits package accompanying EZ designation was for the most part uniform 
across zones through our data period.   
The original eight EZs contained almost 350 census tracts and one million 
residents.  Two later rounds of the program swelled these figures to over 700 census 
tracts with a combined population of over two million individuals in 31 zones (Hanson, 
2008; Greenbaum and Bondonio, 2004). Figure 1 shows the distribution of MSAs with 
EZs across the three rounds.  EZ program benefits are slated to sunset in 2009, making an 
evaluation of its effects especially timely.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Businesses were allowed a tax credit of up to 20% of the first $15,000 in wages paid to zone residents,; an 
increased section 179 tax deduction at $20,000 more than usual annual depreciation and lower-interest 
commercial loans for some facilities. See Hanson (2008) and Busso and Kline (2008) for more details. 
4 The two SEZs (Los Angeles and Cleveland) did not receive the tax credit until 1999 (Busso and Kline, 
2008).   7
Figure 1: Empowerment Zone MSAs across all three rounds. 
 
  Until recently, state programs were the subject of most research examining the 
effects of spatially targeted incentives.  Such research is vulnerable to a host of 
methodological problems, as outlined by Boarnet (2001), chief among which is the non-
random selection of areas for aid.  Peters and Fisher (2002) critically review the literature 
up to that point.  They describe an initial spate of favorable evaluations
5 followed by 
studies showing much smaller or insignificant effects.
6  They posit that the tax incentives 
were too weak or too qualified to make a difference.  Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) 
show that countervailing positive effects on new firms and negative effects on existing 
firms (that exit the zone) account for the insignificant net effects.    
                                                 
5 Erickson and Friedman (1990), Papke (1993) and Papke (1994) are examples. 
6 Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Greenbaum (1998), Greenbaum and Engberg (2000), Engberg and 
Greenbaum (1999), Bondonio and Engberg (2000) and Peters and Fisher (2002) all point towards this 
conclusion.  Elvery (2009), Lynch and Zax (2008) and Landers (2006) are some more recent analyses that 
find insignificant results of enterprise zone status.     8
The literature examining the effects of the federal Empowerment Zone program is 
less developed.  Oakley and Tsao (2006, 2007a, b) use propensity score matching to 
examine the effect of Empowerment Zones on several socio-economic neighborhood 
outcomes in four cities, with a focus on Chicago.  They find some localized effects on 
poverty and related variables in the case of Chicago’s zone, but characterize the effects as 
underwhelming.   
Recently, a series of papers have appeared taking a national perspective on the EZ 
program.  Busso and Kline (2008) use propensity score matching and find positive direct 
effects along a number of dimensions, including employment, poverty and housing 
prices.  Hanson (2008) uses instrumental variables to show that the estimates of positive 
employment effects suffer from endogeneity bias.  He does find significant and 
substantively large program effects on housing values.  Finally, Krupka and Noonan 
(2009) show positive direct effects on housing values, but mixed results on other 
neighborhood variables.  This paper contributes to that stream of literature, provides 
evidence on the robustness of those results and extends that work by exploring the 
simultaneity bias that will be present in single-equation models using similar data.  
 
III.  Empirical Strategy 
Data 
Data for this article came from the US Census for the census years of 1980, 1990 and 
2000.
7  The unit of observation is the block-group as defined in the 2000 census, which 
we call the “neighborhood.”  The other data came from HUD (EZ data) and various GIS 
                                                 
7 The census data came from Geolytics Inc., which provides spatial data over time in a constant geography.   9
sources such as the National Atlas (distance to historic city center).  Neighborhood 
aggregate data are used to estimate the system of equations described below.
8  We restrict 
our attention to a sample of roughly 100,000 metropolitan block groups.   
Model 
The empirical model here is similar to the one developed in Krupka and Noonan (2009).   
The model is a multi-equation, partial-adjustment model, where neighborhood home 
values interact with neighborhood demographics and housing stock characteristics in a 
system of equations.  To reduce the risk of omitted variables bias, all equations are 
estimated in differences.       
11 (1) it t P it EZ it S it N it M it it Equation P P EZ S N M β ββ β ββε − =+ + + + + +        
where t indexes time, i indexes neighborhoods,  1 , , − − = t i t i it X X X 
 for any variable X, P is 
the median house value, S is a vector of structural characteristics of the neighborhood 
housing stock, N is a set of neighborhood demographic characteristics and M is a vector 
of municipal characteristics such as public services, school quality and taxes that may 
vary with time.  The EZ variable allows EZ program participation to have an effect on 
neighborhood housing values, βEZ, perhaps through improvements in services or 
neighborhood infrastructure and amenities.  We call this effect of EZ on neighborhood 
housing values the direct effect of the program because the effect is not transmitted 
                                                 
8 While our use of neighborhood aggregate data limits our ability to infer price effects at the individual 
level, some research has shown that aggregate data can be used to generate reasonably accurate estimates of 
first-stage hedonic effects (Freeman, 1979; Nelson, 1979; O’Byrne et al., 1985; Noonan et al., 2007; 
Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008).  Moreover, the median housing value in a neighborhood is important in 
its own right.  Understanding the effects of policy on neighborhood aggregate prices should be of interest to 
governments in designing such policies and to developers in deciding where to direct investment in 
response to such policies.  The results based on such aggregate measures can be viewed as the effects of 
average policy exposure on average outcomes.    10
through other variables.  Because equation (1) is differenced, βEZ can be thought of as the 
difference-in-differences estimator of the average treatment effect.
9   
The equations describing the evolution of neighborhood housing stock and 
demographic characteristics are similar to the price equation:   
12 (2) it t S it EZ it N it P it M it it Equation S S EZ N P M γ γγ γ γ γε − =+ + + + + +      . 
13 (3) it t N it EZ it S it P it M it it Equation N N EZ S P M δ δδ δ δ δ ε − =+ + + + + +       . 
In equations (2) and (3), S and N respond to P and to one another because of sorting in 
and out of the neighborhood and investment decisions by households and developers.  EZ 
program status might affect S and N because the program’s local implementation may 
spur certain kinds of development or make the neighborhood more attractive to certain 
demographic groups more than others. 
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To generate estimates of the “full effect” from our model, the coefficients from equations 
(1)-(3) must be combined in the appropriate way.  The full effect is derived by taking the 
system of equations (1) through (3), totally differentiating and using Cramer’s Rule to 
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9 Actually, all of our analyses are carried out in the presence of metropolitan-area fixed effects, so that the 
coefficient can be thought of as thrice-differenced, or difference-in-difference-in-differences estimate.   11
The direct effect of program participation on home values appears as the first term in the 
numerator.  The indirect effects of EZ on price through S and N appear as  SE Z NE Z β γβ δ + , 
while the additional effects on P that occur through the interaction of S and N appear as 
SNE Z NSE Z β γδ βδγ + .  The denominator represents a sort of “multiplier process”: 
() () 1 SN P P NS P P β γδ γ β δγ δ −+ −+ .  These effects are more or less intuitively clear.  
However, the careful algebraic derivation of the full effects alerts us to two terms which 
correct for double counting:  EZ N S β γδ −  in the numerator and  NS γ δ −  in the denominator.  
A nice feature of this approach is that the method used to derive it generalizes to more 
complicated empirical settings with more than three equations.  Here we carry out the 
analysis with nine equations.   
We estimate the model represented above as a system of equations, which allows 
us to account for the simultaneity implicit in the rich interactions among P, S and N.   It is 
not possible to estimate these models simultaneously unless we have instruments for each 
endogenous variable.  These instruments must be correlated with the independent 
variable, but not correlated with the error term in each equation.  Our theory suggests that 
the set of twice-lagged levels of each main variable will serve as appropriate instruments 
for P  ,S  , N  and their lags (when present) and will just identify the system.   
In all the above, we have been implicitly assuming that the causal effect of EZ 
program participation is identified in our models.  The work by Greenbaum and 
Bondonio (2004) and much of the literature on the state programs (Boarnet, 2001) 
suggests that this assumption is overly optimistic.  To identify causal effects, we employ 
two methods.  Our preferred method uses a comparison group to serve as a   12
counterfactual.  We alternatively use an auxiliary regression of congressional variables 
inspired by Hanson (2008). 
In the comparison group strategy, we leverage the timing of the program to 
identify a set of block groups that represent what would have happened to EZ 
neighborhoods had they not benefited from the EZ program.  The program had three 
rounds, in 1994, 1998 and 2001.  Because our data end in 2000, there can be no causal 
effect of third round designations on any of our neighborhood variables.  However, 
because all of these neighborhoods are distressed, the experiences of distressed 
neighborhoods designated in the third round serve as a reasonable counterfactual for the 
experiences of distressed neighborhoods designated in the first round.  Two sets of facts 
support the validity of this identifying assumption. The first is that changes in very few of 
our neighborhood variables over the 1980s differ substantively across rounds. Second, the 
metropolitan-standardized changes in prices over the 1980s were statistically 
indistinguishable between zones designated in the first and third rounds.  Both of these 
considerations support our contention that, at the beginning of the 1990s, both round 1 
and round 3 EZ neighborhoods were distressed and likely to face a further decade of 
relative decline.  The similarity of the trends leading into the policy period suggests that 
the trends in absence of the policy intervention would have continued to be similar over 
the 1990s.   
  Because the identifying assumptions of our preferred “comparison group” strategy 
cannot be tested, we also replace round 1 designations with a predicted value of the 
variable fitted from an auxiliary probit.  This is in the spirit of instrumental variables 
estimation.  The predictors in this auxiliary model include a vector of congressional   13
variables and lagged differences (1980-1990) and twice-lagged levels (1980) of the S, N 
and M vectors, except for school expenditures which were not available for 1980.  
Congressional variables measured at the block-group level are: years of seniority of the 
most senior senator; total seniority of senators; count of senators on Appropriations 
committee, count of senators on the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs committee; 
years of seniority of the most senior senator on that committee; count of representatives 
for that block group and count of democratic representatives for that block group.
10  A 
test of whether the congressional variables are jointly insignificant in the auxiliary probit 
is rejected at the 0.0001 level, indicating that politics strongly predicts selection as an EZ.  
The results from this alternative identification strategy, reported below, lead us to believe 
that our preferred strategy is conservative. 
Variables 
There are four arrays of variables used here: P, N, S and M.  Table 1 presents the mean 
changes from 1990 to 2000 for all the variables for which results are reported.  This table 
presents means for the MSA sample and various subsamples of block groups 
participating in different EZ rounds.
11     
 Price  (P) is measured with the log of the median housing value (ln(Md.Val.)) as 
reported in the census long form.  Neighborhood characteristics (N) are comprised of four 
variables (that also come from the census): proportion of families with at least one 
worker (Workers), proportion of households with incomes at or below 150 percent of the 
poverty line (Poverty), proportion of  households that have children (Children) and 
                                                 
10 Alternative variables describing House committee membership variables were not used because they 
overpredict EZ participation. 
11 It is worth noting the strong appreciation of round 1 Empowerment Zones and the weak appreciation of 
round 3 Empowerment Zones.   14
proportion of the population aged over 25 with a college degree (College).  All these 
variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000 in Table 1.  These variables were 
chosen because they have been shown in hedonic studies to affect housing values and 
because they are variables of special interest in the local economic development 
literature.   
The housing stock variables (S) include average number of rooms (Rooms), the 
population density (Density), the proportion of residents renting their property (Renters) 
and the proportion of the housing stock built within the preceding decade (New Units).  
All these variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000 in Table 1.   
Table 1: Means and standard deviations for 1990’s changes, main variables. 
  Variable Sample 
  [Abbreviation]  All Metro  Round 1  Round 2  Round 3 
 Round 1 EZ   0.0084  960
a 0  0 
[EZ1]  0.0911     
 Round 2 EZ   0.0086  0  987
a 0 
[EZ2]  0.0924     
 Round 3 EZ   0.0057  0  0  656
a 
EZ 
[EZ3]  0.0754     
 log median home value  0.3900  0.6278  0.3967  0.2672  P 
[ln(Md.Val.)]  0.3210 0.5934  0.4019 0.3538 
 prop. Working families  0.0046  0.0865  0.0352  0.0390 
[Workers]  0.0957 0.1741  0.1489 0.1467 
 150% poverty rate  0.0006  -0.0377  -0.0230  -0.0307 
[Poverty]  0.1058 0.1909  0.1395 0.1713 
 prop. w/children  -0.0013  0.0054  -0.0021  -0.0047 
[Children]  0.0666 0.1023  0.0816 0.0958 
 prop. with college (25+)  0.0514  0.0316  0.0341  0.0242 
N 
[College]  0.0891 0.0967  0.0966 0.0790 
 Population density  280.47  -512.52  -580.46  -136.75 
[Density]  2372.7 4527.1  8146.8 1990.9 
 avg. rooms  0.0641  0.0401  0.0638  0.0789 
[Rooms]  0.5041 0.7512  0.5514 0.6116 
 prop. Renters  -0.0068 -0.0244 -0.0091 0.0092 
[Renters]  0.1087 0.1528  0.1119 0.1441 
 prop. housing built in 10 years  -0.0672 -0.0253 -0.0413 -0.0370 
S 
[New Units]  0.1929 0.1456  0.1408 0.1285 
 Place: log of households  0.1408  0.0007  0.0335  0.1361 
[Muni.HoHos]  0.1539 0.0624  0.1004 0.0368 
M 
 Place: log of median home value  0.3784  0.4272  0.3506  0.2807   15
[Muni.Vals]  0.2072 0.3419  0.1242 0.0815 
 Place: log of median income  0.2829  0.2799  0.2633  0.2693 
[Muni.Inc]  0.0895 0.1236  0.0583 0.0479 
 District: log expend per pupil.  0.5007  0.5270  0.4594  0.5221 
[Dist.PPExp]  0.2093 0.0873  0.1805 0.2034 
   No. obs (all variables)
b 109,905  749  846  608 
a. Numbers for mean values of the EZ variables for the EZ round subsamples are counts of block groups for which the 
specified variables are equal to one.  Means are shown for all variables, with standard deviations in smaller print below.   
b. The number of observations represents the minimum number of observations across all variables.  The variable with 
the least observations is always the price variable. 
 
The variables discussed thus far are all endogenous in the system of equations 
model.  Several exogenous variables are also included in the analysis.  The municipal-
level variables (M) are measured at the census-defined place level, which is the closest 
approximation to municipalities available.  These local public finance variables are 
considered exogenous because an individual block group generally makes up a small-
enough proportion of the place containing it that it will not affect these broader averages.  
They include measures for the logs of the number of households (Muni.HoHos), the 
median housing value (Muni.Vals) and median income (Muni.Inc).
12  Also included is a 
variable derived from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) School 
District Demographic System (SDDS) and the 1992 and 2002 Census of Governments 
measuring per-pupil expenditure in the elementary or unified school district that contains 
the centroid of the block group (Dist.PPExp) as a measure of public service quality.  
These variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000 in Table 1.   
Finally, three dummy variables constitute our variables of interest (EZ).  They 
capture whether the observation was designated in one of the three rounds of the EZ 
initiative.  Dummy variables indicating designation in the first or second rounds are EZ1 
                                                 
12 If a block-group is not in any Place, then county-level values for these variables are substituted, because 
unincorporated areas generally get public services from county governments.   16
and EZ2, respectively.  EZever takes the value of unity if the block group was ever in an 
EZ, and zero otherwise, thus implicitly capturing selection in the third round in 2001.  
This specification allows for easier interpretation of round 1 selection relative to the 
round 3 comparison group, as previously described.  It uses EZever as a control for 
neighborhood hardship not already captured in the S, N and M vectors, so that the 
coefficient for EZ1 indicates the differential effect of designation in the first round when 
the policy might have had time to affect outcomes by 2000.  When the auxiliary 
regression is used to identify causal effects, the additional EZ2 and EZever control 
variables are not necessary. 
We also include in all regressions a set of time-invariant controls.  In every 
equation, all variables are measured as differences from metropolitan averages.  This is 
equivalent to estimating all equations with metropolitan fixed effects.  Because the 
equations are estimated in differences, this means that each metropolitan area is allowed 
to have its own city-specific trend in prices and the other endogenous variables, and all 
our coefficients are identified off of deviations from metropolitan-wide trends.  
Moreover, in the price equation we also include a set of interactions between the distance 
of each block group to the nearest historic city center (National Atlas of the United 
States, 2004) and the metropolitan area.  This allows every metropolitan area to have its 
own change in the metropolitan area’s “rent gradient.”
13  
 
IV.  RESULTS 
                                                 
13 This also provides scores of additional instruments for the non-price equations in the system.   17
The estimated results are reported in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.  Table 2 includes the results for 
simple OLS estimations.  Columns 2.1 and 2.2 use the comparison group identification 
strategy, while columns 2.3 and 2.4 use the auxiliary regression to identify estimates of 
causal effects.  Across the board, the EZ policy effects are substantial and positive.  The 
conservative estimates put the direct effect of being in EZ round 1 at about 27% while the 
auxiliary regressions put the direct policy effect on home values at almost 60%!  
Columns 2.2 and 2.4 drop the endogenous variables from the regression.  This is a 
simpler way of getting estimates of the indirect effects.  One can think of the policy 
effects in columns 2.1 and 2.3 as the “all else equal” estimates of the policy effect: the 
effect of the policy on housing values holding all demographic and housing stock 
variables fixed.  On the other hand, if we drop those demographic and housing market 
variables from the model, we essentially allow these variables to vary.  Thus, if EZ 
program participation increases housing values directly but also increases them indirectly 
(through poverty reduction, for instance), dropping the intermediate endogenous variables 
allows the indirect effects of program participation to be included in the coefficient on 
EZ1.   
Looking at the estimates of the indirect effects from Table 2, we see that these 
estimates are negative (the “full effects” estimates in columns 2.2 and 2.4 are smaller 
than the “direct effect” estimates in columns 2.1 and 2.3) but the differences are quite 
small relative to the uncertainty about these estimates.  The coefficients on the rest of the 
variables (S, N and M) are generally easily interpretable.  Interpreted as hedonic prices, 
the results suggest that new construction is an amenity (in that people are willing to pay   18
more to live in neighborhoods with more construction), while the presence of children is 
a disamenity.   
The results of our systems of equations estimations are reported in Table 3 for the 
comparison group strategy and Table 4 for the auxiliary probit strategy.  In these tables, 
the regressors are listed along the left side, and each column represents a different 
equation in our system.  The direct effects of EZ program participation on all the 
endogenous variables can thus be read across the top row of both tables and the effect of 
each variable on home values can be read down the left-most column.  In each table, the 
coefficients of each dependent variable’s own lag are boxed out, and these coefficients 
can be read along the diagonal.  
The results are broadly similar across identification strategies.  The EZ1 
coefficient is significant and positive in the home value equation, and the coefficients are 
of similar magnitude across strategies, in the high teens, implying an approximately 20% 
effect on home values.  EZ program participation also appears to have positive effects on 
poverty, proportion of families with children, the proportion of households who own their 
homes and the number of rooms.  The program had negative effects on proportion of 
college educated and population.
14  Finally, the effects of program participation on 
construction of new homes and the proportion of families who work are inconsistent 
across identification strategies.  The program effects on these variables are negative and 
insignificant in the comparison group strategy (Table 3), but positive and significant in 
the auxiliary probit strategy (Table 4).   
                                                 
14 Recall that the areas compared are held constant, so this change in population is not an artifact of 
changing geographical definitions of the units of analysis.     19
The models reported here show mixed results of the federal EZ program.  We may 
be satisfied in the increase in owners and children, while frustrated with the increase in 
poverty and decrease in college educated.  The lack of a consistent effect on labor market 
outcomes of residents is also problematic, as the improvement of labor market outcomes 
for zone residents is one of the primary goals of the program.   
The rest of the results in tables 3 and 4 are less relevant to the policy’s aims, but 
more interesting in what they reveal about neighborhood dynamics.  The lagged variables 
in each equation are (as expected) positive and significant in all cases except for in the 
cases of poverty and children (the lagged children variable is positive and significant in 
the Children equation in Table 4, however).  The effects of the endogenous variables on 
one another are generally significant.  This reinforces the importance of the complex, 
simultaneous system of interactions among disparate characteristics that are embodied by 
neighborhoods.  Most of the variables have reinforcing effects on each other.  For 
instance, increased poverty decreases the proportion of workers, while increased 
proportion of workers decreases the poverty rate in turn.  There are a few exceptions to 
this pattern, most of which involve home values.  One exception that does not involve 
home values is the interaction between renters and families with children.  The results 
show that increasing the proportion of renters in a neighborhood will increase the number 
of families with children, while an increase in the number of families with children will 
decrease the number of renters (the first effect is insignificant in Table 4).   
  The interaction between neighborhood home values and the other endogenous 
variables is also interesting because the changes they represent (relative to the OLS 
estimates in Table 2) shed light on the simultaneity bias present in the more naïve model.    20
Two interesting examples are the proportion of households with children and the 
construction of new housing.  In the OLS models, new construction was positively 
correlated and proportion with children was negatively correlated with home values.  A 
possible interpretation of these coefficients is that the presence of children is a disamenity 
and that new housing is an amenity.  Once the simultaneity bias is accounted for, 
however, we see the causation in these relationships runs in the opposite direction; new 
construction has no effect on median home values, and children increase the value of 
homes in a neighborhood (these are the coefficients in the first column of tables 3 and 4).  
The correlation observed in the OLS models is explained by examining the row reporting 
the effect of higher home values on other endogenous variables; higher home values push 
out families with children and make the construction of new homes more attractive for 
developers (these coefficients are from the fourth row of Table 3 and the second row of 
Table 4).  Similar stories occur with other endogenous variables, although the changes are 
usually a matter of magnitude or significance, not sign.
15 
  With these results in hand, it is straightforward to produce estimates of the full 
effects of the EZ policy on the selected neighborhoods.  Table 5 reports these results for 
housing value or “price” across all four models estimated above.  The first column of 
numbers reports the direct effect: the EZ1 coefficient from the price equations in columns 
1 and 3 of Table 2 and the first cell of tables 3 and 4.  The second column reports the 
estimates of the full effect from the columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 or as computed using an 
expanded equation (5) and the coefficients from tables 3 and 4.  The last columns report 
                                                 
15 It is worth noting here that similar models run with spatial spillovers into nearby neighborhoods deliver 
results that are quite consistent with the results reported above.  The spillover effects were found to be 
positive and significant.   21
the indirect effect and the indirect effect as a proportion of the standard error of the direct 
effect as measures of the magnitude of the changes that come through the system.   
 
 Table 5: Direct, full and indirect price effects of EZ policy.   
   Direct 
Effect (βEZ) 






Comparison  0.2392  0.2221  -0.0171  -0.67 
OLS 
Auxiliary  0.4385  0.4205  -0.0181  -0.38 
Comparison  0.1963  0.2245  0.0282  1.57  System of 
Equations  Auxiliary  0.1763  0.2237  0.0475  1.65 
 
Across the different identification assumptions and estimation techniques, a 
broadly consistent pattern of small indirect effects emerges from Table 5.  These effects 
are small and insignificant when identified with OLS.  By contrast, they are positive and 
more substantial in the system of equations analysis.  These results are qualitatively 
similar to those in Krupka and Noonan (2009), who also find large, positive direct effects 
and generally small indirect effects.  While the indirect effects in the system of equations 
are positive, we wish to stress here their small size in comparison to the direct effects of 
the program.   
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
Findings suggest the EZ program can increase the median price of homes by over 20% on 
average, a rather large effect.  These numbers reinforce the consensus of the most recent 
studies (Krupka and Noonan, 2009; Busso and Kline, 2008; Hanson, 2008).  The large 
direct effects relative to the smaller effects of state programs as discussed in Greenbaum   22
and Engberg (2000) are probably due to higher generosity
16 and visibility of the program 
on the substantive side and the better measurement of program participation on the 
statistical side.  The similarity of the program effects between Table 3 and Table 4, and 
with regard to those reported in other recent studies is reassuring. 
The coefficient on EZever is negative and significant in Table 3. This implies that 
if the first round EZ block groups had not gotten the EZ policy intervention, they would 
have been witness to substantial declines in home values over the 1990s.  The EZever 
coefficient is also likely picking up the “distressed neighborhood” effect that would bias 
down the coefficient on EZ1 (if EZever was not also included).  Interestingly, the EZever 
coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the other equations in Table 3, 
suggesting that the decline of the neighborhood was limited in some sense to the housing 
market.    
Overall, it should be noted that the EZ effects (in tables 3 and 4), are often 
significant, although not always in the direction program advocates may have hoped.  It 
appears that the Empowerment Zone policy intervention (besides boosting home values) 
increased neighborhood poverty, the proportion of households with children, and the 
average number of rooms in dwellings.  It also decreased population density (and thus 
population), the proportion renters, and the proportion of adults with college degrees. 
These effects are not all in the direction that program planners might have hoped.  
Because of these mixed policy effects the indirect effects associated with them tend to be 
small relative to the direct effect of the policy.  The minimal or offsetting effects of the 
                                                 
16 GAO (1999) estimates that round 1 EZs would cost $2.5 billion over the first ten years.  Busso and Kline 
(2008) note an estimate of four dollars of non-federal funds spent for every dollar of SSBG funds in round 
1 EZs.  Concentrating such support in six EZs with fewer than a million total residents might indeed 
reasonably be expected to have sizeable effects.   23
policy through channels other than direct effects on housing values is surprising given the 
goals of the program.  
Although indirect price effects appear minimal, the direct price effects observed 
in tables 3 and 4 point to an important story.  There is a temptation in regressions of 
house values on neighborhood attributes to interpret the coefficients as representing the 
marginal willingness to pay for these neighborhood attributes.  Because our dependent 
variable is similar to the dependent variable in such a first stage hedonic, there is a similar 
temptation here.  The changes between the OLS and systems coefficients highlights that 
this temptation should be resisted, at least with aggregate data such as ours.  Newer 
houses might sell for more, while older/historic neighboring houses might be an amenity.  
Similarly, families with children might buy cheaper houses, while the presence of 
children in a neighborhood could nonetheless increase home values.  Using aggregate 
data means that one must be careful to distinguish between composition effects (a group 
of newer houses will be more expensive on average) and externality effects (a group of 
newer houses makes a neighborhood more desirable).  In this context, the potential 
endogeneity of neighborhood composition becomes a serious issue.         
The simultaneity bias is evident in comparing Column 2.1 (or 2.3) to the first 
column in Table 3 (or 4) where neighborhood attributes are simultaneously determined.  
Here, price is not merely a function of (or composed by) structural (S) and demographic 
(N) features; price also affects those features.  The simultaneous co-determination of P, S 
and N in equilibrium forms the essential backdrop of our empirical investigation of 
neighborhood composition.  Such a framing contrasts with the common framing of some 
attribute (e.g., P) simply being determined by the other attributes.  Interpreting hedonic   24
price gradients as the “effects” of attribute changes on prices relies on the exogeneity of 
those attributes.  If the model for Column 2.1 parallels the hedonic price model, then the 
model in Table 3 relaxes this assumption.   
The substantial changes in the coefficients of our estimated direct effects between 
Table 2 and tables 3 and 4 suggest that, at least with aggregate data, the simultaneity is 
not benign in the sense that the coefficients of exogenous variables (those not included in 
the system) are sensitive to the specification.  This is not so surprising; if the coefficients 
of the endogenous variables in the OLS regressions are biased because they are assumed 
exogenous, the entire coefficient vector will be biased in difficult-to-predict ways.  This 
is evidenced by the change in the estimated effects of round 1 EZ selection (a 0.04 
change in coefficient in the comparison group strategy and a more substantial change of 
over 0.2 in the auxiliary regression strategy) when we move from a single equation to a 
simultaneous equations setting.  A similar shift occurs with the coefficient of EZever, 
which represents our counterfactual.  It is also evident in the coefficients on the 
municipal-level variables, which exhibit large changes between the single-equation 
estimates and the simultaneous equations approach.  This means that the bias implicit in 
assuming away simultaneity is not limited to the endogenous variables, but potentially 
affects all variables, including those of special interest.  Econometricians estimating 
effects in the context of neighborhood change – or any potentially simultaneous system – 
ignore simultaneity at their peril.   
Under certain conditions with microdata, chronology or competitive forces will 
prevent simultaneity from being empirically important in housing market analyses. Still, 
the simultaneity exposed here does raise some interesting questions about interpreting   25
first-stage hedonic price models with transactions data.  While such models cannot help 
but represent the true hedonic price surface faced by home buyers, might P and S 
nonetheless be simultaneously determined so that the coefficients do not represent causal 
effects?  The hedonic price surface functions to equate the supply and demand of specific 
housing attributes in the local housing market (Rosen, 1974).  The response of a specific 
attribute to changes in its own hedonic price is part of the theory, and not a problem in 
estimating hedonic price surfaces.  However, it is also possible that investments in a 
structure’s attributes (refurbishment, refinishing or additions) will respond to changes in 
the structure’s overall value (or, more technically, the unexplained portion of its price).  
For instance, in a gentrifying neighborhood, owners might use increased assessed values 
to secure home equity financing for home improvements, or add features to the house so 
that the structure will be attractive to the incoming residents.  Similar investments would 
not be as likely in homes located in neighborhoods suffering generalized decline in 
demand.   
To the extent that home improvement is responding to the changes in 
neighborhood value (as opposed to changes in the prices of specific attributes), some of 
the partial correlation between the resultant improved attributes and housing values will 
be spurious and the characteristics of individual housing units will suffer from 
endogeneity bias.
17   Similar arguments might hold for neighborhood-level demographic 
characteristics.  High-status families will be wary of moving their assets into 
neighborhoods that are poor investments so that increases in the “status” of the 
neighborhood’s residents will both affect and be affected by changes in neighborhood-
                                                 
17 Epple (1987, p. 63) shows that the price level will effect the hedonic price of an attribute under certain 
circumstances, for instance.   26
level demand for the neighborhood.  Ioannides (2003) discusses endogenous social 
effects in housing valuation in greater detail and shows (for data using owner-reported 
valuations) how they can significantly affect hedonic estimates.  Thus, even in 
differences, neighborhood demographics and housing stock characteristics might be 
endogenous predictors of housing prices.   
While it is easiest to motivate this endogeneity with unobserved neighborhood 
effects, the dynamic can also arise due to omitted or unobserved attributes or amenities, 
common shocks at scales more local than the neighborhood or even shocks to individual 
structures.  If home-owners or developers respond to an unexplained higher value of the 
site by building different types of housing attributes on that site, the “hedonic prices” of 
those attributes will be biased and inappropriate as either the measure of the equilibrium 
price of the attribute or as inputs into the second stage of a hedonic demand study. 
Common use of home equity loans – the availability and size of which are conceivably 
correlated with home price appreciation – to expand or refurbish homes could exacerbate 
the bias, at least if credit constraints are important.   
In our aggregate data, the system of equations exposes simultaneity across most 
neighborhood characteristics and substantially changes the price equation coefficients.  
Whether these same problems cause bias in first-stage hedonics using transactions data 
remains to be seen.  It does not seem particularly controversial to suggest that the 
addition of an extra bedroom or bathroom, installation of hard-wood floors, cementing in 
of a fireplace, subdivision of a lot or structure or finishing of a basement could be 
undertaken with the future sales price of the home in mind, and not just the hedonic 
prices of the affected attributes.  Unfortunately, we cannot address the empirical   27
importance of such considerations here.  While the difference between the partial 
correlation expressed by an OLS hedonic price surface and a causal effect may be of little 
import to a home buyer, this distinction is significant for developers, policy makers and 
incumbent residents deciding on investment in their existing structure’s characteristics.  
For them, well-identified, causal effects are the relevant effects if and when they do differ 
from the relatively easily observed hedonic price surface.  These hedonic price effects are 
also a critical input into analyses of housing demand (the second stage of hedonic 
demand studies).  These results suggest that their sensitivity to forms of misspecification 
besides functional form is warranted. 
  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
This paper uses a rich simultaneous equations framework to examine the effects of a 
major economic development policy: the federal Empowerment Zone program.  Because 
of its generosity and design, this program offers the best chance to find positive effects of 
spatially targeted economic development policies.  The system of equations approach 
adopted here recasts the neighborhood as the result of a complex interplay of forces 
coming from the housing market, demographic sorting and residential development.  It 
allows for a much richer picture of neighborhood outcomes to emerge.   
The results on the direct and indirect effects are striking in light of the goals and 
rationale of the policy.  Empowerment Zones were not supposed to be property value 
enhancement programs.  Instead, EZs were understood as attempts to improve 
neighborhoods across many dimensions.  One would thus expect that the direct effects of 
Empowerment Zone interventions would be minimal, but that the indirect effects that   28
they catalyze would be large.  We find instead that the direct effects are large, while the 
indirect effects are complex and mostly offsetting. These results fit well into the existing 
literature on spatially targeted economic development programs.   
These results suggest some interesting and perhaps troubling questions should be 
asked about the EZ program and other spatially targeted economic development policies.  
The results for poverty and education in the system of equations are consistent with the 
policy making neighborhoods less attractive to middle-class families, the results for 
density suggest a decrease in population, and the results for renters suggest a decrease in 
the rental housing stock.  One interpretation of these results is that program monies were 
used to destroy low-value housing and rental properties, leaving a smaller but more 
expensive stock of owner occupied homes in a neighborhood catering to low-income 
households.  Lynch and Zax (2008) suggest that the lack of employment effects is due to 
the capitalization of business incentives into non-residential land prices.  To the extent 
that zoning is flexible enough to allow residentially zoned land to be transferred into non-
residential land, this increase in commercial real estate prices could push up home values.  
While we do not believe either of these effects could be big enough to account for the 
entire EZ effect in our estimates, it does suggest caution in interpreting the large increases 
in home values as pure benefits of the program in terms of neighborhood quality of life.       
    The more important contribution of the paper, however, is the presentation of a 
parsimonious-yet-complex system of many important economic and demographic forces 
that are affected by the EZ program which allows us to expose and explore the 
simultaneous relationships among neighborhood characteristics.  The full results allow 
for a very rich view of the interactions among housing market, demographic and housing   29
stock characteristics in U.S. metropolitan areas.  It sorts out causal pathways between 
housing prices and neighborhood characteristics, and it lays bare the simultaneous effects 
of these characteristics on one another.  The simultaneity raises additional concerns about 
the use of aggregate data to infer policy effects.  The substantial changes in our policy 
effects as we move from our OLS models to our system of equation models suggests that 
– in the presence simultaneity – single-equation estimates of neighborhood-level effects 
with aggregate data can be in considerable error even when appropriate identification 
strategies are used for the variables of interest.
18  Thus, besides offering evidence on the 
effects of an increasingly popular form of government intervention in cities, our analysis 
offers a better understanding of neighborhood dynamics and the rich simultaneity present 
in the spatial working-out of metropolitan housing markets. 
 
References 
Aaronson, D. (2001). "Neighborhood Dynamics." Journal of Urban Economics 49(1): 1-
31. 
 
Bartik, Timothy J. (1991).  “Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development 
Policies?”  Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute. 
 
Boarnet, Marlon G. (2001).  “Enterprise Zones and Job Creation: Linking Evaluation and 
Practice.”  Economic Development Quarterly, 15(3): 245-254. 
 
Boarnet, Marlon G. and William Bogart (1996).  “Enterprise Zones and Employment: 
Evidence from New Jersey.”  Journal of Urban Economics, 40(2): 198-215. 
 
Bond, Eric W. and N. Edward Coulson (1989).  “Externalities, Filtering and 
neighborhood change.”  Journal of Urban Economics, 26: 231-249. 
 
                                                 
18 Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) acknowledge – but do not address – this possibility in their analysis of 
hazardous waste sites.   30
Bondonio, Daniele and John B. Engberg (2000).  “Enterprise Zones and Local 
Employment: Evidence from the States’ Programs.”  Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 30(5): 519-549. 
 
Bondonio, Daniele and Robert T. Greenbaum (2007).  “Do local tax incentives affect 
economic growth?  What mean impacts miss in the analysis of enterprise zones 
policies.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics  37(1): 121-136. 
 
Brueckner, Jan K. (1980).  “Residential succession and land-use dynamics in a vintage 
model of urban housing.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics. 10: 225-240.  
 
Brueckner, Jan K. and Stuart S. Rosenthal (forthcoming). "Gentrification and 
Neighborhood Cycles: Will America's Future Downtowns be Rich?" Forthcoming in 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 
 
Busso, Matias and Patrick Kline (2008).  “Do local economic development programs 
work?  Evidence from the federal Empowerment Zone program.”  Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper No. 1638, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 36.  
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1090838 
 
Card, D., E., A. Mas and J. Rothstein (2007) "Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation" 
(April 2007). NBER Working Paper No. W13052. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=986902 
 
Elvery, Joel A. (2009).  “The impact of enterprise zones on resident employment: an 
evaluation of enterprise zone programs of California and Florida.”  Economic 
Development Quarterly 23(1), 44-59. 
 
Engberg, John B. and Robert T. Greenbaum (1999).  “State Enterprise Zones and 
Housing Markets.”  Journal of Housing Research, 10(2): 163-187. 
 
Epple, Dennis (1987). “Hedonic prices and implicit markets: estimating demand and 
supply functions for differentiated products.”  Journal of Political Economy, 95(1): 
59-80. 
 
Erickson, Rodney and Susan Friedman (1990).  “Enterprise Zones 2: A Comparative 
Analysis of Zone Performance and State Government Policies.”  Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, 8(4): 363-378. 
 
Freeman, A. Myrick III, (1979) “The Hedonic Price Approach to Measuring Demand for 
Neighborhood Characteristics,” in Segal, David, ed. The Economics of Neighborhood 
(New York, Academic Press), pp. 191-217. 
 
Galster, George, J. Cutsinger and U. Lim.  (2007) “Are Neighborhoods self-stabilising?  
Exploring endogenous dynamics.” Urban Studies 44(1): 167-186. 
   31
Greenbaum, Robert T. (1998).  An Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Policies: 
Measuring the Impact on Business Decisions and Housing Market Outcomes.  
unpublished PhD. Thesis, H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and 
Management. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
Greenbaum, Robert T. and Daniele Bondonio (2004).  “Losing Focus:  A Comparative 
Evaluation of Spatially Targeted Economic Revitalization Programmes in the US and 
the EU.”  Regional Studies, 38(3): 319-334. 
 
Greenbaum, Robert T. and John B. Engberg (2000).  “An Evaluation of State Enterprise 
Zone Policies.”  Policy Studies Review 17(2/3): 29-46. 
 
Greenstone, Michael and Justin Gallagher (2008).  “Does Hazardous Waste Matter:  
Evidence from the Housing Market and the Superfund Program.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 123(3): 951-1003. 
 
Hanson, Andrew (2008).  “Poverty reduction and local employment effects of 
geographically-targeted tax incentives and grants: an instrumental variables 
approach.”  Urban and Regional Analysis Group Working Paper No. 08-10, Georgia 
State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. 
 
Ionnides, Yannis M. (2003). “Interactive property valuations.”  Journal of Urban 
Economics, 53: 145-170. 
 
Kain, John (1968).  “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan 
Decentralization.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82: 175-197. 
 
Krupka, Douglas J.  and Douglas S. Noonan (2009).  “Empowerment Zones, 
neighborhood change and owner-occupied housing.”  Regional Sciecne and Urban 
Economics,  34(4): 386-396. 
 
Landers, Jim (2006).  “Why don’t enterprise zones work?  Estimate of the extent that EZ 
bnefits are capitalized into property values.”  Journal of Regional Analysis and 
Policy, 36(1): 15-30. 
 
Lynch, Devon and Jeffrey S. Zax (2008).  “Incidence and substitution in Enterprise Zone 
Programs: The case of Colorado.”  Unpublished working paper available at 
http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/Zax/workingpapers/LynchandZax.pdf . 
 
McCarthy, John (1998).  “US Urban Empowerment Zones.”  Land Use Policy, 15(4): 
319-330. 
 
National Atlas of the United States (2004) Cities and Towns of the United States, 
National Atlas of the United States, Reston, VA.  Last accessed online on 10 August 
2005 at: http://nationalatlas.gov/atlasftp.html 
   32
Nelson, Jon P. (1979) “Airport Noise, Location Rent, and the Market for Residential 
Amenities,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 6, pp. 320-
331. 
 
Noonan, Douglas S., Douglas J. Krupka and Brett M.Baden (2007).  “Neighborhood 
Dynamics and Price Effects of Superfund Site Clean-up.”  Journal of Regional 
Science 47(4): 665-692.  
 
Oakley, Deirdre and Hui-shien Tsao (2006).  “A new way of revitalizing distressed urban 
communities?  Assessing the impact of the federal empowerment zone program.”  
Journal of Urban Affairs 25(5): 443-471. 
 
Oakley, Deirdre and Hui-shien Tsao (2007a).  “Socioeconomic gains and spillover effects 
of geographically targeted initiatives to combat distress: An examination of Chicago’s 
Empowerment Zone.”  Cities 24(1):43-59. 
 
Oakley, Deirdre and Hui-shien Tsao (2007b).  “The Bottom-Up Mandate: Fostering 
Community Partnerships and Combating Economic Distress in Chicago’s 
Empowerment Zone.”  Urban Studies 44(4): 819-843. 
 
O’Byrne, Patricia Habuda, Jon P. Nelson, and Joseph J. Seneca, (1985) “Housing Values, 
Census Estimates, and the Environmental Cost of Airport Noise: A Case Study of 
Atlanta,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 
169-178. 
 
Papke, Leslie (1993).  “What Do We Know about Enterprise Zones.”  In Poterba, James, 
ed.  Tax Policy and the Economy. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research and MIT Press, pp. 37-72. 
 
Papke, Leslie (1994).  “Tax Policy and Urban Development: Evidence from the Indiana 
Enterprise Zone Program.”  Journal of Public Economics 54(1): 37-49. 
 
Peters, Alan H. and Peter S. Fisher (2002).  “State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have they 
Worked?”  Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute. 
 
Rosen, Sherwin (1974). “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product differentiation in 
pure competition.”  The Journal of Political Economy, 82(1): 34-55. 
 
Rosenthal, Stuart S. (2008). "Old Homes, Externalities, and Poor Neighborhoods: A 
Model of Urban Decline and Renewal" Journal of Urban Economics 63(3): 816-840. 
 
Schelling, T. C. (1969). "Models of Segregation." The American Economic Review 59(2): 
488-493. 
 
Schelling, T. C. (1971). "Dynamic Models of Segregation." Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology 1(2): 143-186.   33
 
Wallace, Marc A. (2003).  “An Analysis of Presidential Preference in the Distribution of 
Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities.”  Public Administration Review 
63(5): 562-572. 
 
Wallace, Marc A. (2004).  “Congressional considerations and urban characteristics in the 
selection of empowerment zones and enterprise communities.”  Journal of Urban 
Affairs, 26(5), 593-609. 
 
Winnick, L. (1966).  “Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity: Welfare Considerations in 
the Geographic Redistribution of Economic Activity,” in Real Estate Research 
Program, University of California at Los Angeles, Essays in Honor of the Sixty-fifth 




   34Table 2: OLS (first difference) regressions of ln(Md.Val) 
 2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4 
 coef  t coef t coef t  coef t
EZ1  0.2392 9.35 0.2221 8.52 0.4385 9.18  0.4205 8.73
EZ2  0.0386 1.86 0.0221 1.04        
EZever  -0.0184 -1.22 -0.0045 -0.29        
Workers  0.0220 1.52     0.0236 1.78     
Poverty  -0.1613 -13.33     -0.1607 -13.43     
Children  -0.0367 -2.18     -0.0408 -2.42     
College  0.4088 31.76     0.4091 32.67     
Density  2.06×10
-6 2.80     2.69×10
-6 3.19   
Rooms  0.0937 34.81     0.0952 35.58     
Renters  0.0811 5.57     0.0776 5.34     
New Units  0.1795 33.12     0.1793 33.27     
Muni.HoHos  -0.0526 -7.19 -0.0435 -5.57 -0.0428 -5.84  -0.0339 -4.36
Muni.Vals  0.5380 43.28 0.5741 45.42 0.5338 42.30 0.5703 44.41
Muni.Inc  0.0619 4.00 0.1813 11.40 0.0572 3.74  0.1760 11.18
Dist.PPExp  0.0027 0.62 0.0109 2.40 0.0035 0.82  0.0124 2.72
R-sq 0.1597    0.0780  0.1625   0.0792  
obs 107413    108068  106769   106782  
Note:  All regressions include MSA dummies, MSA-specific rent gradients and county amenity score. 
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Table 3: 3SLS estimation using control-group identification strategy. 
 
     
 
 Equation (Dependent Variable) 
 
      ln(Md.Val)a Workers Poverty Children College Density Rooms Renters New Units 
EZ1  0.1963 -0.0110 0.0170 0.0122 -0.0291 -752.63 0.0818 -0.0239 -0.0032 
   10.92 -1.42 2.66 2.91 -4.05 -4.95 2.08 -3.31 -0.16 
EZ2  0.0435 -0.0069 0.0067 0.0114 -0.0130 -693.81 0.0632 -0.0213 -0.0030 
   2.46 -0.95 1.12 2.96 -1.95 -4.94 1.73 -3.18 -0.16 
EZever  -0.0551 0.0068 -0.0012 -0.0027 0.0052 89.15 0.0047 0.0018 0.0105 
   -4.00 1.22 -0.25 -0.89 1.01 0.81 0.17 0.34 0.74 
ln(Md.Val)  0.1614 0.1457 0.0011 -0.0400 0.1702 574.69 0.3954 -0.0406 0.2688 
   15.74 13.06 0.13 -6.31 16.21 2.50 6.86 -3.67 9.45 
Workers  0.4166 0.0375 -0.5471 0.3263 -0.5771 3244.38 -4.0711 0.3383 -2.3983 
   4.71 3.69 -30.77 23.18 -23.98 5.99 -37.29 13.27 -46.28 
Poverty  -1.1228 -1.2093 0.0121 0.3776 -0.6345 13792.14 -6.5324 0.6753 -3.6083 
   -9.65 -42.90 1.39 22.16 -18.07 20.60 -45.79 19.81 -55.29 
Children  1.0082 1.8682 1.1119 0.0105 1.0130 7023.89 6.1152 -0.1035 4.8429 
   4.79 37.50 25.77 1.26 17.15 6.52 21.25 -1.90 40.32 
College  0.2064 -0.5605 -0.2122 0.2251 0.6064 -1331.16 -1.9052 0.0765 -1.2269 











   3.54 3.67 14.39 12.55 -3.00 5.68 21.85 -24.14 11.86 
Rooms  0.0012 -0.1667 -0.1194 0.0339 -0.1098 2323.34 0.0239 0.1169 -0.4611 
   0.06 -35.04 -28.36 10.12 -19.90 22.33 3.81 25.33 -38.64 
Renters  -0.4430 0.4926 0.5329 0.0700 0.1357 -19969.50 4.7556 0.0440 1.8285 
   -2.86 11.03 14.26 2.89 3.09 -27.78 24.91 4.79 16.81 
New Units  -0.0128 -0.3083 -0.2275 0.1186 -0.1534 2727.61 -1.4732 0.1589 0.0421 






















Muni.HoHos  -0.0099 0.0122 -0.0030 -0.0139 0.0172 600.44 -0.0197 0.0167 0.0065   37 
   -0.99 2.97 -0.86 -6.43 4.49 7.61 -0.97 4.41 0.63 
Muni.Vals  0.5708 -0.0594 0.0089 0.0159 -0.0678 -467.03 -0.1297 0.0132 -0.0920 
   50.72 -7.94 1.47 3.85 -9.70 -3.13 -3.40 1.83 -4.80 
Muni.Inc  -0.1016 0.0610 0.0374 -0.0068 0.0511 -977.79 0.4082 -0.0667 0.1680 
   -4.91 7.46 5.45 -1.51 6.57 -6.04 10.06 -8.80 8.09 
Dist.PPExp  0.0102 0.0097 0.0075 -0.0040 0.0072 -85.75 0.0465 -0.0046 0.0326 
   1.89 4.23 3.95 -3.29 3.41 -1.90 4.02 -2.14 5.60 
Note:  All equation include metropolitan fixed effects.  Price equation also includes county-level amenity score and the interaction between a metropolitan dummy 
and the block groups distance to the nearest place center.   38 
Table 4: 3SLS estimation using auxiliary regression identification strategy 
  
Equation (Dependent Variable) 
   ln(Md.Val)  Workers Poverty  Children College Density  Rooms Renters  New  Units
EZ1  0.1763 0.0253 0.0409 0.0171 -0.0240  -1395.73 0.2414 -0.0637 0.0657
  6.14 2.28 4.25 2.68 -2.19  -7.5 4.21 -6.06 2.21
ln(Md.Val)  0.1672 0.1344 0.0170 -0.0278 0.1623  -238.36 0.5595 -0.0750 0.2862
  15.97 12.14  1.93  -4.38 15.27  -1.25 9.75  -6.82 9.92 
Workers  0.3065 0.0464 -0.5975 0.3132 -0.5925  5674.72 -4.5949 0.4709 -2.5277
  3.18 4.48  -32.53  20.72 -23.19  12.04 -41.03 18.21  -45.96 
Poverty  -0.9392 -1.2272 0.0066 0.4313 -0.7435  12173.28 -6.4567 0.7159 -3.7070
  -7.40 -44.18  0.76  25.01 -20.71  21.51 -43.87 20.73  -56.67 
Children  1.5293 1.7799 1.2091 0.0232 0.9617  3083.33 7.0545 -0.3186 5.0200
  7.57 36.79 29.08  2.59 16.27  3.30 24.98 -5.82  42.29 
College  0.0763 -0.5349 -0.2464 0.2163 0.6166  770.26 -2.2880 0.1495 -1.2835










  -0.17 6.65  13.33  6.84  1.96  14.10  15.25  -19.16  12.14 
Rooms  0.0614 -0.1711 -0.1163 0.0434 -0.1276  1707.70 0.0396 0.1168 -0.4636
  3.08  -37.82  -27.35  13.09  -23.78  18.34  5.93  25.37  -38.88 
Renters  -0.9011 0.5773 0.5215 0.0015 0.2718  -14878.97 4.4310 0.0589 1.8908
  -6.06 13.50 14.07 0.06 6.14  -23.21 22.94 6.62 17.32
New Units  0.0029 -0.2997 -0.2298 0.1259 -0.1655  3178.17 -1.4791 0.1748 0.0400
  0.13 -53.72 -53.35 38.61 -23.70 22.70 -50.55 26.16 6.93
Muni.HoHos  0.0020 0.0081 -0.0035 -0.0130 0.0128 496.13 0.0055 0.0155 0.0027
  0.19 1.97 -0.99 -5.81 3.22 7.41 0.27 3.99 0.25
Muni.Vals  0.5758 -0.0537 0.0012 0.0082 -0.0632  -68.96 -0.2191 0.0320 -0.1004
  49.65 -7.24 0.19 1.97 -8.90 -0.55 -5.75 4.45 -5.16
Muni.Inc  -0.1229 0.0632 0.0364 -0.0101 0.0564  -511.15 0.4190 -0.0690 0.1623
  -5.85 7.85 5.29 -2.24 7.15  -3.76 10.26 -9.02 7.68






















  1.99 4.34 4.02 -3.66 3.68  -2.56 4.13 -2.25 5.58  39 
Note:  All equation include metropolitan fixed effects.  Price equation also includes county-level amenity score and the interaction between a metropolitan dummy 
and the block groups distance to the nearest place center. 
 
 